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COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW
No thunder was cast from the legal summit of the Tenth Circuit
with regard to commercial law this survey period. Certain rumblings, in
the form of commercial law decisions, did make themselves heard, how-
ever, in the Survey Editor's office. Of particular interest was the circuit
court's decision in Scivally v. Time Insurance Co. ,I which distinguished be-
tween a negligent delay in issuing an insurance policy and a bad faith
breach of the implied duty of fair dealing. In banking, the court en-
forced a loan agreement in excess of the bank's legal lending limit even
though the borrower had knowledge of the limit.2 Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, the court rendered a questionable decision involving
a bank's liability for a loss in a loan agreement resulting from a forged
signature card. 3 Finally, in the area of trademark infringements, the
court looked at the "Brew Nuts," "Beer Nuts" litigation.
4
I. THE DUTY Or FAIR DEALING IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Can a bad faith delay in issuing an insurance policy, which results in
a loss of coverage for an insured, expose an insurance company to dam-
ages for breach of the duty imposed upon the insurance industry to deal
fairly with its customers? Under the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Scivally,
without an issued, effective policy, no damages, punitive or otherwise,
may be awarded for a breach of the implied duty of fair dealing. 5 The
court stated that the implied duty arises only from the insurance con-
tract. 6 Thus, when no such policy is issued, a plaintiff is limited to dam-
ages in tort for negligent delay in issuing a policy.
7
In the Scivally case, Scivally contacted an insurance agent on Febru-
ary 21, 1980, to request a replacement for her health and accident insur-
ance policy which was to expire on March 16, 1980.8 She specifically
asked that her new policy begin on March 15.9 Scivally paid her first
premium, signed the application form and was given a "conditional re-
1. 724 F.2d 101 (10th Cir. 1983) (a diversity action arising in Oklahoma).
2. See National Farmers Org., Inc. v. Kinsley Bank, 731 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1984).
See infra text accompanying notes 33-52.
3. See Bridgeport Firemen's Sick and Death Benefit Ass'n v. Deseret Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 735 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 53-81.
4. See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 320 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1981),
rev'd, 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra text accompanying notes 82-109.
5. 724 F.2d at 104.
6. id.
7. Id. The Scivally opinion conforms with settled law that a plaintiff may not recover
for both negligent delay in tort and breach of the implied duty of fair dealing, an action
sounding in contract, but the circuit court goes even further than this by holding that,
under the facts of Scivally, no action for breach of the implied duty of fair dealing can lie at
all. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
8. 724 F.2d at 102.
9. Id.
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ceipt".' 0 She was injured in a car accident on March 15 and subse-
quently requested coverage under her policy.' I Time Insurance denied
liability because it had not yet effectuated her policy.'
2
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's directed verdict for Time
on the issue of breach of the implied duty of fair dealing.13 The circuit
court also upheld the trial court's verdict in favor of Scivally for the neg-
ligent delay in issuing the policy.14
Had the circuit court simply held that because Scivally had suc-
ceeded on her tort claim she was precluded from maintaining her breach
claim, a claim sounding in contract, the court's opinion in Scivally would
be of little interest. The circuit court's opinion, however, does not so
confine itself. Under Scivally, a well established remedy is eliminated; a
breach claim is completely disallowed where the insurance company has
not issued a timely policy, regardless of the reason, and the plaintiff is
limited to the tort claim for negligent delay. The Scivally decision not
only ignores Oklahoma precedent,15 it ignores the policy underlying the
implied duty of fair dealing, a policy eloquently espoused by the Tenth
Circuit in a case decided during this same survey period: "Because of
the special relationship between an insurer and its insured, and because
of the quasi-public nature of the insurance industry . . . a duty [is im-
posed] upon the insurance carrier to deal fairly with their customers
apart from any contractual obligations owed."'
16
This language apparently recognizes an implied contract theory of
recovery for the insured. Moreover, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
Peddicord v. Prudential Life Insurance Co., 17 has also approved actions based
upon an implied insurance contract. Peddicord held that an applicant
whose insurance contract was not issued within a reasonable time could
sue on the implied promise to act reasonably, or waive the contract and
sue in tort. 18 According to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, an action for
delay in issuing a policy actually sounds more in contract than in tort,
especially where the first premium has already been paid, 19 as in
Scivally's case.
20
The only feature distinguishing Peddicord from Scivally is that the re-
ceipt tendered to Peddicord at the signing of the insurance agreement




13. The court found that the trial court granted the directed verdict on erroneous
grounds, but upheld the directed verdict because of the non-issuance of the policy. Id. at
103.
14. Id.
15. See Peddicord v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 498 P.2d 1388 (Okla. 1972).
16. McCarty v. First Ga. Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 609, 611 (10th Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added).
17. 498 P.2d 1388 (Okla. 1972).
18. Id. at 1390.
19. Id. at 1389.
20. 724 F.2d at 102.
21. 498 P.2d at 1388.
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Scivally receipt stated that the effective date of the policy would be either
the "requested date" or when medical examinations were completed, if
required.2 2 No medical examinations were required in Scivally. The
court, however, deemed the policy not in effect when Scivally's injury
occurred because it was issued with riders after the March 15 date.
2 3
Despite the factual differences between these two cases, the rule in Peddi-
cord and the Tenth Circuit's own prior case law warranted a recognition
of an implied contract theory of recovery in the Scivally case.
The Alabama Supreme Court was also presented with questions
very similar to those raised in Scivally in Barnes v. Atlantic and Pacific Life
Insurance Co. 24 The conditional or "binding receipt" in Barnes was similar
to the one in Scivally. 2 5 In both cases, for the policies to become effec-
tive, the receipts required that the policies had to be issued within a
certain time limit and issued according to the exact terms of the applica-
tion. In both cases the conditions of the receipts were not met, trigger-
ing the defense arguments that the policies were not issued at the time
of the injury.2 6 The Barnes decision stated that the trier of fact should
determine whether the insurer unreasonably delayed in issuing the pol-
icy. A finding of unreasonable delay would estop the insurer from deny-
ing coverage. 2 7 The Scivally court did not address this estoppel theory.
The Scivally decision permits the conclusion that if a company decides
not to issue a policy it can avoid liability for breach of the implied duty
of fair dealing and thus insulate itself from punitive damages based on
such a theory.
28
22. The "effective date" language of the receipt given to Scivally reads:
"Effective Date" as used herein:
Means the later of (a) the date the application is signed, (b) the date of completion of all
medical examinations, if required, and (c) the Requested Policy Date shown on the
application, but for health insurance, not more than 10 days prior to the receipt
of the application by the Company.
724 F.2d at 102 n.l (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 103.
24. 325 So. 2d 143 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified unset-
tled questions of insurance law in Barnes to the Alabama Supreme Court. 514 F.2d 704
(1975). The Fifth Circuit accepted the Alabama Supreme Court's answers and vacated and
remanded the case to the trial court for a resolution of the material issues of fact presented
in light of the supreme court's answers to the certified questions. 530 F.2d 98 (1976).
25. See 325 So. 2d at 146, and 724 F.2d at 102 n.l.
26. The Barnes policy was issued one day after Barnes' injury. 325 So. 2d at 147. The
Scivally policy was issued twelve days after Scivally's injury. 724 F.2d at 103.
27. 325 So. 2d at 150.
28. In asserting her claim that Time acted in bad faith, Scivally relied on Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978). In analyzing Christian, the
Tenth Circuit stated:
In Christian, the Oklahoma Supreme Court approved and adopted "the rule
that an insurer has an implied duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with its
insured and that the violation of this duty gives rise to an action in tort for which
consequential and, in a proper case, punitive damages may be sought." 577 P.2d
at 904. The source of the implied duty is the contract between the insurer and
the insured.
Consequently, if there is no contract-no policy of insurance-then there is
no implied duty upon which to base the cause of action.
Scivally, 724 F.2d at 103-04.
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Under general contract theory, the Scivally decision might be sup-
ported by the rule that an application for insurance is a mere offer, and
if the policy is issued with riders it is a counteroffer. 29 Thus, reasonable-
ness may not be an issue when there is no contract as a matter of law.
This was considered in Barnes but rejected because, according to the
court, where the occurence of a condition is wholly controlled by one
party, "there is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing" owing
from the insurer.3 0 Thus, the Barnes court pointed out that there is a
duty to act reasonably in processing an applicant's insurance policy, and
to act unreasonably can expose an insurance company to liability for
breach of the implied duty of fair dealing.3 ' The logic of this rule
should be especially persuasive in the Tenth Circuit in light of the
court's recognition of the quasi-public nature of the insurance indus-
try.3 2 Perhaps the circuit court should consider these factors in deciding
a future case similar to Scivally, and in so doing overrule the broad lan-
guage of Scivally.
II. LEGAL LENDING LIMITS IN BANKING
In National Farmers Organization, Inc. v. Kinsley Bank,3 3 the defendant
bank agreed to loan the plaintiff, a Kansas sheep farmer, enough money
to finance the purchase of 17,000 Colorado sheep.3 4 After advancing
the farmer enough money for the down payment, and after the first
sheep were delivered, the bank dishonored the farmer's checks and re-
fused to loan him any further funds.3 5 The sheep farmer sued the bank
to enforce the loan contract and was awarded damages by the trial
court.
3 6
On appeal, the bank argued as a defense that the loan contract was
unenforceable because the final amount of the loan exceeded Kansas'
legal lending limit to a single borrower-15% of the banks unimpaired
capital and surplus.3 7 In spite of its illegality, the Tenth Circuit held the
loan to be enforceable.3
8
There is a split of authority on the issue of whether a bank loan in
29. See, e.g., Barnes, 325 So. 2d at 148-49 (citing Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 292 Ala. 525,
529, 296 So. 2d 900, 903 (1974)).
30. Barnes, 325 So. 2d at 150.
31. See Annot., 18 A.L.R. 4th 1115 (1982) for an annotation covering the liability of
an insured for delay in issuing a policy of insurance.
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33. 731 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1984).
34. Id. at 1466.
35. Id. at 1466-67.
36. Id. at 1466.
37. Id. at 1467. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1104 (1982). All states in the Tenth Circuit
and most other states have similar laws limiting either the amount of a single loan or the
amount of total outstanding loans. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-7-108(e) (1973 & Supp.
1984) (15%); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-21(e) (1977) (10%); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 802
(West Supp. 1983-84) (20%); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-19 (1982) & Supp. 1983) (15%);
WYo. STAT. § 13-3-402 (1977) (20%). See also 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(a)(2) (1972) (governing
federal banks) (15%).
38. 731 F.2d 1469. Other, less significant, issues decided in National Farmers Organiza-
tion but not covered in this survey included a brief discussion of agency law, the appropri-
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excess of the bank's legal lending limit is enforceable.3 9 Injaynes v. First
National Bank,40 the borrower's knowledge of the fact that his loan was in
excess of the legal lending limit was held to make the loan unenforce-
able. The Ninth Circuit in that case did not enforce a loan agreement in
excess of the legal amount where a cashier of the bank was the recipient
of the loan. 4 1 In pertinent part, the Ninth Circuit stated: "If this were
the plight of an innocent borrower who had assumed the bank knew
what it was doing . . . we could at least express our sympathy."' 42 The
Jaynes court then found that the cashier knew the amount of the bank's
capital and surplus, presuming he had heard of the bank's ten percent
limit.4 3
The Tenth Circuit in National Farmers Organization took a different
approach regarding the borrower's knowledge of the bank's lending
limit. Mr. Burkhart, the plaintiff, presumably knew of the bank's lending
limit because he was well acquainted with the bank's president.4 4 Ap-
parently, the Tenth Circuit set Mr. Burkhart apart from the loanless
cashier inJaynes on the ground that Burkhart also knew that the bank
could have legally exceeded its lending limit by working through a cor-
respondent bank.4 5 This knowledge precluded any culpability on Burk-
hart's part,4 6 and rendered moot the issue of his knowledge of the
lending limit.
The primary reason for the court's enforcement of the loan was
based on its view of the nature of loan limitation laws. The laws are
intended as rules for the government of the bank, in the sense that they
impose no penalty on the borrower. 4 7 The court noted the general rule
that borrowers are still obliged to pay back excessive loans,48 and con-
cluded that lenders, therefore, should not be able to avoid liability, espe-
cially where the borrower has concluded an agreement in reliance on the
ateness of allowing the jury to decide the issue of the definiteness of the loan agreement,
lost profits and incidental and punitive damages. Id. at 1469-73.
39. See, e.g.,Jaynes v. First Nat'l Bank of Ketchikan Ala., 236 F.2d 1956 (9th Cir. 1956)
(unenforceable: invalidity of contract as exceeding loan limit not a valid basis for defense
of borrower to avoid liability); International Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Bank of Wadley, 407 F.
Supp. 1270 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (unenforceable: contracts that require the doing of an illegal
act are void and unenforceable); First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481 (Miss.
1978) (enforceable: loan limits are not so commonly known that knowledge of them could
be imputed to the borrower); Labor Discount Center, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 526
S.W.2d 407 (Mo. App. 1975) (enforceable: no knowledge on the part of the borrower as
to existence of a lending limit).
40. 236 F.2d 1956 (9th Cir. 1956).
41. Id. at 259.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 259-60.
44. 731 F.2d at 1469. The bank was so familiar with Burkhart that it was standard
practice for the bank to honor Burkhart's checks before he had signed any loan agreement
for the funds. Id. at 1460.
45. 731 F.2d at 1469.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1468 (citing Bank of College View v. Nelson, 106 Neb. 129, 130, 183 N.W.
100, 101 (1921)).
48. 731 F.2d at 1468.
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
loan. 4
9
In essence, the court held that loans in excess of the legal lending
limit are nonetheless enforceable against both contracting parties. The
question arises: is the legislative intent behind such laws being accom-
plished? Could it have been the legislature's intent in passing such a law
to provide sanctions 50 only against a violating bank, or is there also an
important economic reason for prohibiting such loans? If the object of
lending limit laws is to protect the bank's depositors, stockholders, and
the public in general from extremely speculative loans, 5 1 then perhaps
such loans should not be enforced. While it is true in this case that the
bank was capable of financing the loan through a correspondent bank,
much of the language of National Farmers Organization implies that logic
and equity demand the general enforcement of excessive loans, regard-
less of such capability.
5 2
It is unclear whether the probable use of a correspondent bank in
National Farmers Organization was the primary reason for the holding or
merely a consideration. How the Tenth Circuit would hold in a case
involving a completed loan in excess of the legal amount, with no use of
a correspondent bank, is therefore uncertain.
III. BANK LIABILITY ON FORGED COMMERCIAL PAPER
A leading UCC case decided by the Tenth Circuit during this survey
period also involved the banking industry. The case, Bridgeport Firemen's
Sick and Death Benefit Association v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion, 53 involved an ingenious embezzlement scheme designed by a cor-
porate officer, a motion for summary judgment granted in favor of the
embezzled corporation, and a convoluted Tenth Circuit opinion, per
Judge Doyle, suggesting that under the UCC the loss should fall back on
the bank-barring a finding by the trial court, on remand, that the plain-
tiff corporation was negligent 54 or that the Utah Fiduciaries Act ap-
plied.5 5 This section of the survey focuses primarily on the UCC
portion of the Bridgeport decision.
Bridgeport obtained a $100,000, ten-year certificate of deposit from
Deseret. 56 At the time the certificate was obtained, Bridgeport submit-
49. Id. at 1469.
50. In Kansas it is a misdemeanor for any banker, officer, employee, director or agent
of a bank to fail to perform a duty required by the banking statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-
2001 (1982).
51. See Dove Creek St. Bank v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 157 Colo. 263, 274, 402
P.2d 369, 375 (1965) (business of banking bears such a relation to the economic security
of the public so as to be a proper subject of regulation by the state in the exercise of its
police power).
52. See 731 F.2d at 1468 (citing Bank of College View v. Nelson, 106 Neb. 129, 131,
183 N.W. 100, 101 (1921)). The Court considers the fact that many of the cases denying
enforcement were decided before the widespread use of correspondent banks, 731 F.2d at
1467, but cites Nelson, a 1921 case, as persuasive authority. Id. at 1468.
53. 735 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 387.
55. Id. at 387-88. See infra note 64.
56. Id. at 384.
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ted a signature card authorizing four of its corporate officers to transact
business. 5 7 Among those authorized were Bernard Packo, Treasurer,
and William Egan, Secretary. 58 The account remained unused for two
years. Then Mr. Packo, in a well planned scheme, decided to embezzel
$90,000 from the account.
59
Packo walked into the Deseret Bank one day with the following:
1) the certificate of deposit; 2) a letter ostensibly signed by Packo and
Egan notifying the bank of the recent election of a Mr. Coffin, Secretary,
and three other new officers (all fictitious); 3) a letter bearing the ficti-
tious Coffin's signature, authorizing Packo to borrow $90,000 for the
company; 4) a new signature card containing Coffin's and Packo's signa-
ture along with a resolution authorizing any two officers to transact busi-
ness; and 5) a promissory note bearing Coffin's signature. 60 With these
documents Packo was allowed to sign the promissory note, pledging the
certificate of deposit as collateral, and walk out of the bank with a check
written to Bridgeport for $90,000. Deseret retained the certificate, re-
fusing to return it to Bridgeport. 6 1 Mr. Packo was, of course, never
heard from again.
6 2
Bridgeport sued Deseret to recover the certificate of deposit. At the
trial court, Bridgeport prevailed on a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court declared that the loan and related pledge of the certifi-
cate were made without authority and were therefore void, and that Des-
eret had converted Bridgeport's certificate of deposit.
6 3
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed, to varying degrees, three
arguments raised by Deseret: 1) that the Utah Fiduciaries Act 6 4 shel-
tered Deseret from liability; 2) that Deseret did not breach the contract
with Bridgeport because the transaction with Packo "was authorized by
virtue of the fact that the documents contained the requisite two signa-
tures and/or by Packo's indicia of authority"; and 3) that Deseret had a
complete defense in that it was a holder in due course of the certifi-
cate.6 5 Neither Deseret nor Bridgeport argued that the UCC applied to
the case. Nevertheless, Judge Doyle embarked upon a confusing and
unnecessary UCC discourse by announcing: "The applicability of the
UCC to this transaction was not specifically argued by the parties. How-
ever, the parties have implicitly assumed applicability of the Code."
'66
Judge Doyle reasoned that under the UCC an unauthorized signa-





60. Id. at 384-85.
61. Id. at 385.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 22-1-1 to -10 (1953 & Supp. 1983).
65. 735 F.2d at 385.
66. Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
67. U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (1977). The section reads in full:
Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose
1984]
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and an instrument bearing such a signature is not properly payable.68
Furthermore, both forgeries and signatures made in excess of an agent's
authority are within the UCC's definition of "unauthorized." '69 The
Tenth Circuit then determined that the signature of the fictitious Coffin
was a forgery, and it therefore need not reach the issue of whether
Packo's signature alone was an unauthorized signature.70 The Court
concluded that the bank could be found liable for the loss provided that
Bridgeport was not precluded from recovery because of its own
negligence.
7'
This reasoning, however, is significantly complicated by the particu-
lar facts of Bridgeport. In Bridgeport, the bank paid funds out of its own
account to Packo, not out of the certificate of deposit account, and sim-
ply took a pledge of the certificate of deposit funds. The only negotiable
instrument bearing a forgery was the promissory note.7 2 No funds were
actually "paid" on the note, in the ordinary sense of the term, in that no
debit was specifically charged against the certificate of deposit account.
The bank simply refused to deliver the certificate upon Bridgeport's
request.
73
In order to justify its discussion of the UCC, the court made a
strained analogy: "Here, the defendant, in essence, made a payment out
of the plaintiff's account which was not properly payable. . . because of
the forged signature on the promissory note . . . . Defendant did this
by giving Packo a check for $90,000 and retaining the certificate of de-
posit."'74 When does one sign a promissory note in order to draw on his
own funds? This question was not answered by the Bridgeport decision.
In fitting this case within the parameters of the UCC, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has tread upon new ground. This probably accounts for the notable
lack of case authority in the opinion. 75 The court has presented few
guidelines for similar fact situations which might arise in the future.
Perhaps it should have followed the district court's lead and focused pri-
marily on the forged signature cards. 7 6 Instead, the Tenth Circuit rea-
soned that although a signature card is "perhaps not a negotiable
instrument," it should not be viewed in isolation.7 7 Rather than raise
issues which were neither pleaded nor proven in the lower court, the
Tenth Circuit could have correctly and adequately resolved the appeal,
name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it; but it operates
as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of any person who in good
faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.
Id.
68. 735 F.2d at 387. See also U.C.C. § 3-401 (1977).
69. 735 F.2d at 386. See U.C.C. § 3-404 (1977) (Comment 1).
70. 735 F.2d at 386.
71. Id. at 387. See U.C.C. § 3-406 (1977).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing UCC §§ 4-401, 3-404 (1977)).
75. The court cites only one case, Perini v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977), in the entire UCC portion of the opinion. See 735 F.2d at 386-87.
76. 735 F.2d at 385.
77. Id. at 386.
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as presented by the parties, based on the common law. Under the com-
mon law, not only is a bank charged with knowledge of its depositer's
signatures, 78 but also the bank is under a duty to inquire into an individ-
ual's corporate authority. 79 If the Tenth Circuit had chosen this course,
it could have held the bank liable without discussing the UCC.
Ultimately, advocates may convincingly maintain that Judge Doyle's
UCC discussion was not necessary for the resolution of the case and is
therefore mere dicta. The court's only clear holding is that under the
Utah Fiduciaries Act,80 the question of whether Packo had apparent au-
thority to pledge the certificate is a question of fact. Therefore, the trial
court erred in determining that, as a matter of law, Packo had no appar-
ent authority. 8 ' On the other hand, the UCC language of the Bridgeport
decision may be cited as persuasive authority for the following proposi-
tions: the presence of a forgery on a negotiable instrument which re-
quires two signatures may result in the burden of loss being carried by
the lender accepting the instrument;8 2 and the presence of a forgery on
such a negotiable instrument renders the instrument not properly paya-
ble, regardless of the presence and validity of other signatures.
IV. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Is the use of "Brew Nuts" as a logo on a package of sweetened,
salted nuts an infringement of the "Beer Nuts" registered trademark?
The trial court had answered this question in the negative in Beer Nuts,
Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co. ,83 and found the case remanded to it by the
Tenth Circuit.
8 4
The trial court had based its decision primarily on a side-by-side
comparison of the packages and found the "Brew Nuts" product pack-
aging and wording sufficiently unique. 85 According to the trial court,
the "Beer Nuts" trademark has two functions, to describe the contents
of the package, and to identify to the consumer the corporate source of
the product, the latter referred to as the trademark's "secondary mean-
ing".8 6 The trial court determined that the trademark was only entitled
to protection as to its "secondary meaning". 8 7 Noting the packages
were dissimilar in color, lettering, and style, and that the Clover Club
trademark appeared conspicuously on every "Brew Nuts" package, the
trial judge surmised: "The eye of this court is not confused, nor is the
78. See, e.g., Sabatino v. Curtis, 446 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1971).
79. See Wheat State Ser. Corp. v. Colfax Nat'l Bank, 44 Colo. App. 376, 618 P.2d 698
(1980).
80. See supra note 64.
81. 735 F.2d at 388.
82. The court gave only cursory attention to Deseret's claim of being a holder in due
course (and, presumably, not a payer, drawee bank). Id. at 386.
83. 520 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1981).
84. 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983).
85. 520 F. Supp. at 398. Copies of the packages appear in the text of the opinion. Id.
at 401-02.
86. Id. at 398.
87. Id.
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eye of the consuming public likely to be."'a8 The question of confusion
being one for the finder of fact and determinative of the infringment
claim, Beer Nuts was denied relief.8 9 A quick perusal of the packages in
question90 left little doubt in this author's mind as to the soundness of
the district court's opinion. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, how-
ever, was not so moved, and in a complex decision, remanded the case
pointing out that the district court did not apply the appropriate legal
standards or weigh all the relevant evidence. 9 1
It is not difficult to extract from the circuit court's decision exactly
where the district court erred. "[Ilt is axiomatic in trademark law that
side-by-side comparison is not the test."' 92 It is difficult, however, to
assimilate the myriad of factors mentioned as components of an in-
fringement determination.9 3 According to the court, it is not simply
similarity in sight or sound which constitutes infringement; infringement
can also be found where concepts or ideas are commingled. 94 The court
minimized the importance of the dissimilarity in packaging, focusing in-
stead on whether confusion, sensory or conceptual, would result if the
"mark" 9 5 were singly presented to the public. 96
What was important to the court was not so much the similarity of
the names as the extenuating circumstances. The court indicated the
importance of considering whether the market channels are convergent,
increasing the likelihood of confusion, 97 whether the products them-
selves are very much alike, 98 -the degree of care the ordinary purchaser
exercises in buying a product of the same general nature, 99 and the in-
tention of the actor in adopting the mark.'0 0 The Tenth Circuit re-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 397. "The pivitol question still remains the same, are the terms used so
similar that the public is likely to be confused as to the origin of the product." Id.
90. See 520 F. Supp. at 401-02.
91. 711 F.2d at 940-42.
92. Id. at 941 (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir.
1980)); American Home Products Corp. v.Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir.
1978); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976);
Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (D. Kan. 1977)).
93. These were components the trial court ignored, according to the Tenth Circuit.
"[T]he [trial] court erroneously equated likelihood of confusion with similarity. Similarity
must be considered along with other factors .. " 711 F.2d at 942.
94. Id. at 940. "Confusion of origin of goods may be caused by confusing similarity in
the meaning of the designations employed." Id. at 940-41 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74 (10th Cir. 1958)) (emphasis added).
95. Despite the conspicuousness of the Clover Club registered trademark on the
"Brew Nuts" packages, the court apparently determined that the "Brew Nuts" logo was
being used as a trademark, noting the much larger lettering and distinctive style of the
"Brew Nuts" mark. Id. at 938. At the end of its infringement discussion, however, the
court stated: "Although we offer no opinion regarding the merits of this case, we remand for a
proper evaluation of similarity and a reconsideration of likelihood of confusion. ... Id.
at 942 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 941.
97. Id. The trial court did note that both products were sold in supermarkets and the
like. 520 F. Supp. at 397.
98. 711 F.2d at 941.
99. Id. In this respect, the Tenth Circuit noted that purchasers of inexpensive or "im-
pulse" items are more likely to be confused than purchasers ofi more costly items. Id.
100. Id. at 940 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938)).
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manded the case with instructions for the trial court to consider these
alternative factors.'
0 '
The Beer Nuts case is significant because it will affect the decision-
making process of marketers. The court explored this process, noting
the testimony of the president of Clover Club concerning his decision to
use the "Brew Nuts" name.10 2 The court stated, however, that the in-
tent of the alleged infringer is only part of the complete test and not in
itself determinative. '
0 3
The Beer Nuts case presented a compounded problem in that the
product in question is hard to describe as other than "Beer Nuts." Nuts
can be sweetened and salted in a number of different ways, thus making
an attempt to describe the nuts merely as sweetened and salted some-
what hopeless. 10 4 The Court did discuss the possibility of a "fair use"
defense,' 0 5 the use of a trademark for descriptive purposes only, but
dismissed its application in Beer Nuts because it was not raised.1
0 6
In attempting to move trademark infringement law -away from the
subjective "side-by-side comparison" test, the Tenth Circuit may have
made the test even more subjective. Determining when "ideas" are
commingled and sufficiently similar as to cause confusion among ordi-
nary shoppers will not be an easy task for judges, let alone marketing
executives. The complexity of factors can only be viewed as somewhat
subjective in themselves, despite their objective language.
10 7
V. CONCLUSION
The cases examined in this survey article do not represent the en-
tirety of the noteworthy commercial cases recently decided by the Tenth
Circuit. Two cases concerning the effects of declarations made by insur-
ance agents when issuing insurance policies are recommended for com-
101. 711 F.2d at 942.
102. Id. at 938 n.4. The company also considered the name "Ah Nuts", but was con-
cerned that the nature of the product inside would be a mystery, even with "sweetened
salted peanuts" written on the package. Id. Perhaps Clover Club should have considered
the possibilities: "Brew Ha Ha Nuts," "Nutz fer Beer," or "Suds Nuts."
103. Id. at 941. The court stated that the intent to pass one's goods off as another's
raised an inference of confusion. Id.
104. See supra note 102.
105. 711 F.2d at 937-38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1982), which provides for the use of
registered trademarks by persons other than the registrant under certain conditions.
106. 711 F.2d at 937.
107. For an informative case discussing the general area of trademark infringement
law, see Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
981 (1981). See also Beatrice Foods Co. v. Neosho Valley Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 297 F.2d
447 (10th Cir. 1961) ("Meadow Sweet" and "Meadow Gold"); Nebraska Consol. Mills Co.
v. Shawnee Milling Co., 198 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1952) ("Mother's Best" and "Mother's
Pride"); Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1965) (the
somewhat humorous contrast of "Beanee Barbeque" and "Barbeque Beans"). For discus-
sions concerning the descriptive nature of certain trademarks, see Kellog Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) ("Shredded Wheat"); Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-
Cola, Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941) ("Cola"); American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creame
Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970) ("Aloe"). A
trademark can be cancelled because of its long continued use as a generic term. See, e.g.,
Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (1950) ("Escalator").
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parison. s0 8 Bank counsel might also note Hibernia National Bank v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. ,109 which outlines a depositor's right to set
off his deposit accounts against any loan obligations he has with an in-
solvent bank, despite the fact that his loans were participated in or
purchased by another bank. CMI Corp. v. Leemar Steel Co. Inc. 110 provides
an excellent factual vehicle for a discussion of the closely wed theories of
rejection of goods and revocation of acceptance of goods.
Matthew G. Walton
108. Compare McGehee v. Farmers Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1984) (insurer
estopped from asserting interest uninsurable where agent wrote policy with full knowledge
of circumstances) with Catts Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 723 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1983) (insurer
not estopped from asserting no coverage even though agent informed insured that goods
would be covered as long as insured retained an interest).
109. 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. 733 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1984).
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